Nick Sirianni’s aggressiveness was sure to please Jeffrey Lurie, but is the Eagles coach driven by analytics?

Asked before last season how aggressive he would be on fourth downs, Nick Sirianni divulged little about his plans for competitive reasons. Even as the Eagles coach’s first year unfolded, it was difficult to get a grip on his to-go-for-it-or-not philosophy. He at times alternately appeared progressive and conservative.

But the numbers from the 2021 season are in, and Sirianni ended up one of the more aggressive coaches in the NFL. He ranked sixth in the league, according to Football Outsiders’ aggressiveness index for the regular season, which was released in February.

According to Sirianni, he would have pushed the envelope on fourth down even more had the Eagles not been so successful on third down — they finished fourth in the league — last season.

“The outside world doesn’t know how aggressive we’re actually going to be because … we were a really good third-and-1-to-4 offense,” he said last month during an interview with The Inquirer. “That’s why we were in the top five. A lot of those times we were like, ‘We’re going for it right here,’ but we just got the first down [on third down].

“I could argue that we would have been even more aggressive.”

Football Outsiders did include in its formula qualifying opportunities for when coaches should roll the dice based on its analytics. So while Sirianni’s rate of 16.5% on fourth downs (16 of 97) was 11th, his lower “expected” percentage increased his overall number and placed him behind just five coaches in aggressiveness.

Last season, NFL coaches went for it more than ever (450 times) and more than double the amount just four years prior (215 times). The rate has steadily climbed in each of the seasons since 2017, from 6.6% to 8.9% in 2018, 9.9% in 2019, 13.4% in 2020, and lastly, 14.3% in 2021.

Those numbers exclude obvious catch-up situations. But when Football Outsiders analyzed the rates over the last 25 years, which included all fourth-down situations, the rate hovered around 12% until 2017 and is now above 20%.

The increasing use of analytics in the NFL has certainly played a role in the upward trend, so much that Football Outsiders changed its metric for aggressiveness this offseason to reflect a new league average. But the inflection point, most agree, came after Doug Pederson and the Eagles’ success on fourth downs in 2017.

“Philly Special” in Super Bowl LII was Pederson’s most memorable gamble, but it was just the culmination of a season’s worth of aggressiveness. The copycat NFL paid notice and coaches started going for it more, especially on fourth-and-1-or-2, inside the 10, and between the 35-yard lines.

But expanding analytics departments, led by progressive leadership, and younger, offensive-minded coaches willing to utilize probability-based reasoning have also been why other teams have followed the Eagles’ lead.

“I wasn’t going into ‘17 trying to be a trendsetter,” Pederson said last month. “We were trying to do what’s best to win football games. Any time that we could maybe steal a possession on offense, we were going to do that back then. But I think because of that you’re seeing more teams around the league go for it [on] fourth-and-1, fourth-and-2.”

Only the Packers’ Matt LaFleur went for it on fourth-and-1 at a higher rate (7 of 8) than Sirianni (6 of 7) last season. But in terms of attempts, the Colts’ Frank Reich led the NFL, going for it on fourth-and-1 a total of 16 out of 20 times.

Reich, the Eagles’ offensive coordinator from 2016-17, brought with him to Indianapolis Pederson’s fourth-down charts, but more so his mentality. Sirianni was there alongside Reich as his offensive coordinator with the Colts for three seasons.

There are many variables at play on any given fourth down. Yardage, field position, and score are the most basic. The numbers are sometimes black-and-white, or in terms of the charts, green for go or red for stop. But there is a yellow area that can be influenced by offensive or defensive predilection.

It is also when a coach’s proverbial gut instinct can come into play. Sirianni seemingly took this approach more than Pederson.

“Let me just say this, I don’t necessarily just say, ‘I’m following this chart,’” he said.

Or his pre-thought-out game plans. In general, the Eagles prepared to be aggressive against opponents they viewed as better and conservative against teams deemed the lesser. But there were times, especially in the latter category, when they had to adjust their tactics.

“It changed because the game changed,” Sirianni said. “And so, I think — and I know not everybody thinks that way — that’s smart football. And there are definitely definite ways to do it. But you live off past experiences of what’s worked for you and what didn’t work for you. And you try to grow from those.”

The same thinking applies to myriad other decisions in which the analytics on past performances can be applied: some overarching like whether to pass or run, and some very specific like whether to call this play, on this down-and-distance, in this situation, with this personnel vs. this team, in this personnel, in this scheme, etc.

It’s not just about fourth downs or when to go for two. And, ultimately, the point is to put your team in the best position to win based on probability percentage.

Analytics is just another term for the numbers-crunching that low-level assistants had been doing for NFL teams for years. But the Eagles were among the first teams to take the next step and hire outside consultants to dig deeper in an attempt to find any additional edge over their competitors.

Owner Jeffrey Lurie increasingly championed its usage, but it wasn’t until Pederson that he found a vessel open to some of the more advanced statistics. The coach didn’t go quite as far as Lurie had hoped, and there was increasing friction between his staff and the analytics department led by Alec Halaby.

As the Eagles’ fortunes declined following the Super Bowl, Lurie would occasionally use Halaby’s data as a means to second-guess Pederson, as previously reported by The Inquirer. But it was often smooth sailing, especially early on.

And that appears to have been the case last year with Sirianni. He has said that Lurie only offered his support and that his rapport with Halaby and his staff went swimmingly.

“I trust them, and I really value what they do,” Sirianni said. “I guess, for the longest time it was always, hey, you’re watching tape. But it is good to be able to watch the tape and then apply the analytics after you watch the tape.”

But Lurie’s opinions on the subject have been well-established. He wants aggressive-minded forward-thinkers, and in many cases, those coaches tend to come from offensive backgrounds.

It is one reason why Lurie’s last four coaches have been from that side of the ball. Of the top half ranked in Football Outsiders’ aggressiveness index for 2021, 12 are offensive-minded coaches.

Of the bottom half, 10 have defensive backgrounds. But the No. 1-ranked coach, whose aggressiveness index was more than double the average, was the Chargers’ Brandon Staley, whose coaching experience has been almost exclusively on defense.

Staley played quarterback in college. He often talks like an offensive coach and uses analytical phrases to explain his choices. But since his controversial fourth-down decisions late last season, he has pushed back against being known as the “Analytics Guy.”

When you have Justin Herbert at quarterback, it makes sense to lean aggressive. And Staley has said as much, but the reasoning he gave when asked about his handling of fourth downs last month at the NFL owners’ meetings sounded very much old-school.

“Take the math out of it. Take the process out of it,” Staley said. “What you’re trying to do is you’re trying to build a belief system in your team. When I came into the Chargers, so much about being a head coach is what type of identity are you bringing to your team? What are you about?

“The competitive spirit that happens between the white lines, you want your players to be fearless, you want your players when the money is on the line, you want them to be ready for that situation.”

In a December rematch against the Chiefs, the Chargers failed on three fourth-down attempts within field-goal range. They eventually lost in overtime. The most scrutinized decision came before the half when, ahead 14-10, Staley went for it on fourth-and-goal at the 1-yard line and a Herbert pass was deflected.

A month later, in the season finale against the Raiders, with a playoff berth on the line, he went for it on fourth-and-1 on the Chargers’ 18 in the third quarter, trailing 17-14. Running back Austin Ekeler was dropped for a loss, and Las Vegas kicked a field goal after the turnover on downs.

But Staley received the most criticism for a timeout he called with 38 seconds left in overtime when the Raiders faced third-and-4 at the L.A. 34. Many observers believed Las Vegas would be content to sit on the ball when a tie would have sent both teams into the postseason.

Staley, though, believed that the Raiders might attempt a field goal after a short run and he wanted to get the right personnel on the field. Josh Jacobs still ran for 10 yards after the timeout, setting up the game-winning 47-yard field goal by All-Pro kicker Daniel Carlson.

The Chargers coach defended his decisions after the game, saying what mattered was that by having the appropriate personnel he gave his team the best chance to win. The analytics community had his back, at least as far the controversial fourth down, saying he increased the Chargers’ win probability.

And that is, ultimately, the objective of analytics: not the result, but that Staley put his team in the best position to win at the time the decision was made.

He’s still not being as aggressive as the analytics community recommends. There is data that endorses the idea to almost never punt. While the curve has been trending upward, Staley said the results-oriented NFL will likely make it difficult for coaches to take extreme risks.

“I think what you’re going to see is it’s going to depend on how it goes for them,” he said. “You’re going to see how committed people are to that because you can start down a road and then if it doesn’t go down, a lot of people are intrigued. Because it’s got to be an organizational commitment.”

Organizations such as the Eagles, 49ers, and Browns have long been ahead of the curve and implemented analytics into almost all phases of football operations. That doesn’t mean they want to devalue innate coaching. But dismissing the math out of sheer pride would be depriving yourself valuable information.

“I think organizationally we’re always trying to win on the margins and find any advantage that we can,” Browns coach Kevin Stefanski said. “And there’s a lot of times on fourth down there, we feel good about our options in those moments. But then personally, we want to play to win. I want to make sure I’m always coaching to win.

“I think players appreciate that when you’re playing and coaching to win as opposed to being risk averse.”

Stefanski ranked third in Football Outsiders’ aggressiveness index, behind Staley, the Cardinals’ Kliff Kingsbury, and ahead of the Lions’ Dan Campbell, LaFleur and Sirianni, even though he didn’t have one of the better quarterbacks in the NFL.

The same could be said of Campbell and Sirianni. The Eagles coach said that establishing an identity wasn’t a motivating factor in his aggressiveness. His reasons were often more pragmatic and based on their success rate in running in short-yardage situations.

“I’m not trying to compare our offense to the Chiefs’, but we were an explosive offense, and a good running team,” Sirianni said. “We felt good that on fourth down, that in those situations on third down, that we did get the first down, that we would convert because we had faith in our run game on that third-and-1-to-4 area.”

But in most scenarios, passing the ball increases the odds for success. Sirianni understood as much, otherwise he wouldn’t have gone into last season throwing as much as he did even though his offense wasn’t best suited to an air attack.

He adjusted, though, and played to the strengths of quarterback Jalen Hurts and implemented a run-heavy system. But the Eagles also benefited from a soft schedule in the second half of the season, and when they faced the Buccaneers in the playoffs, the limits of their offense were exposed.

Tampa Bay shut down the ground game and Sirianni’s likely plan to be aggressive against Tom Brady and company never quite got off the ground. The Eagles never got into a favorable fourth-down situation on their first three possessions, and when they finally did gamble, they were already behind, 17-0.

Hurts converted on fourth-and-4 at the Tampa 47 with a 10-yard pass to tight end Dallas Goedert. But four plays later, on fourth-and-10, he couldn’t hook up with receiver Jalen Reagor and the Eagles’ hopes for a comeback began to slip away.

“There were games that we went into this year and we said, ‘We’re going to be aggressive when we need to be.’ And I think that’s smart football,” Sirianni said. “Not every number is created equal.”

The Eagles, though, know their best long-term odds for becoming a perennial playoff team with championship potential come with having first and foremost a dynamic passing game. From Sirianni to general manager Howie Roseman to Lurie, indications from team leaders last month were that the Eagles will exhaust their resources to improve their air game.

“There’s nothing Jalen [won’t be able to do],” Lurie said. “We just have to keep evolving that offense in every single way. Time will tell, right? Nick’s an aggressive offensive guy, and I know he feels there’s just so much growth in what we can do on offense. And he is very bullish on all the things we can do this coming season and in the future.”

Being even more aggressive is likely one of them.